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Abstract
We present a multi-attribute decision model and a method for explaining the decisions
it recommends based on an argumentative reformulation of the model. Specifically, (i)
we define a notion of best (i.e., minimally redundant) decisions amounting to achiev-
ing as many goals as possible and exhibiting as few redundant attributes as possible,
and (ii) we generate explanations for why a decision is best or better than or as good
as another, using a mapping between the given decision model and an argumentation
framework, such that best decisions correspond to admissible sets of arguments. Con-
cretely, natural language explanations are generated automatically from dispute trees
sanctioning the admissibility of arguments. Throughout, we illustrate the power of our
approach within a legal reasoning setting, where best decisions amount to past cases
that are most similar to a given new, open case. Finally, we conduct an empirical evalu-
ation of our method with legal practitioners, confirming that our method is effective for
the choice of most similar past cases and helpful to understand automatically generated
recommendations.
Keywords: multi-attribute decision-making, explainable artificial intelligence,
computational argumentation, natural language generation
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1. Introduction
Numerous intelligent systems with (semi-)automated decision-making capabilities
have been developed recently, in settings as diverse as loan assessments (Niu et al.,
2017), financial investment (Sul et al., 2017), risk assessment (Song et al., 2017), self-
driving car (Huval et al., 2015), automated negotiation (Luo et al., 2003a; Cao et al.,
2015) and healthcare (Williams et al., 2015). Several of these systems lack interpretable
internal components and are as a consequence black-boxes. This is widely perceived as
an issue to be addressed (Dong et al., 2017a,b; Ding et al., 2017; Wachter et al., 2017),
as without a clear understanding of how a recommended decision is generated, it is hard
to ensure human trust, debug and improve these systems. In particular, when mission-
critical tasks are carried out (e.g. by self-driving cars), it is important that human users
understand the rationale behind decisions (Dong et al., 2017a) so that they may trust
the system enough to delegate their task to it. Actually, trust can be seen as the glue
that holds human users and systems together and the lubricant for tasks to be carried
out smoothly, with systems’ failures, such as Google autonomous car’s crash (Mathur,
2015) and Tesla autopilot fatal car’s crash (Banks et al., 2017), generating mistrust.
Human trust can be strengthened by an understanding of why an intelligent system
acts in a certain way, or comes to reach a certain conclusion, and explanations are
means to facilitate this understanding. In the case of decision-making models, it is very
important for humans to understand and trust the decisions recommended, especially
when applications require the engagement of human users (Lacave and Dı´ez, 2002;
Teach and Shortliffe, 1984; Tintarev and Masthoff, 2012, 2015). For example, when
an intelligent decision-support system in healthcare suggests to a doctor to carry out an
aggressive medical treatment on a patient, in order to make sure it is proper the doctor
and/or the patient needs to understand why it is necessary. As another example, when
a judge needs to make her judgement according to the sentence of a previous case that
is most similar to the current case, a decision-aid system could indicate one such a case
for the judge, but to avoid making a wrong judgement, the judge needs the explanation
of the recommendation by the system.
Argumentation has been seen as an effective means to facilitate many aspects of
decision-making and decision-support systems (Fox et al., 2010; Nawwab et al., 2008),
especially when decisions recommended by such systems need to be explained. How-
ever, with few exceptions (notably Amgoud and Prade (2009); Matt et al. (2009); Fan
and Toni (2013); Visser et al. (2013)), it is unclear whether or not the output deci-
sions of argumentation-based methods can be deemed to be rational in some decision-
theoretic sense. Furthermore, current works in argumentation-based decision-making
either fail to automatically generate explanations (e.g. see Atkinson et al. (2004)) or
consider the outputs of argumentation engines as a form of explanation directly (e.g.
see Kakas and Moraitis (2003)), even though these may be obscure to domain experts
who are non-experts in argumentation. In this work, we present an argumentation-
based decision-making model that can produce automatically generated natural lan-
guage argumentative explanations obtained from an argumentation engine, for rational
decisions, and evaluate it empirically with domain experts.
More specifically, we study multi-attribute decision-making where goals may not
be fulfilled by some decisions, depending on whether or not these decisions exhibit
2
attributes capable of achieving those goals. We give rational decisions in the sense
that they achieve most goals (namely they are strongly / weakly dominant in the sense
of Fan and Toni (2013), see Section 2) and also are minimally redundant, by having as
few redundant attributes (i.e., attributes that do not contribute to achieving the goals)
as possible. Then, in the spirit of Fan and Toni (2013), we develop a process that
maps the type of decision framework we study to a concrete instance of Assumption
Based Argumentation (ABA) (Bondarenko et al., 1997; Dung et al., 2009; Toni, 2014),
so that rational (strongly/weakly dominant and minimally redundant) decisions corre-
spond to arguments belonging to admissible sets. Then, we can use the argumentation
process to produce natural language explanations of the reason why some decisions
are considered better (more rational) than or as good (analogously rational) as others.
Our method generates explanations automatically, using template-based algorithms in
the spirit of Winograd (1972); Reiter and Dale (2000), from dispute trees computed as
argumentative explanations as standard in ABA. Moreover, we conduct an empirical
evaluation of our method with legal practitioners, pointing to potential for impact of
our method in practice.
In our model, best decisions are defined as minimally redundant (strongly/weakly
dominant) decisions because, in application domains, redundant attributes could be
harmful. Take an example of a physical education teacher who needs to choose amongst
two pupils to finalise the composition of the school’s water polo team. Suppose that
both pupils are experienced swimmers and are keen to join the team, and one of the
two, but not the other, is in the rugby team. This latter attribute is redundant (for play-
ing water polo) and could be a distraction/possible source of injuries. As a result, the
pupil not in the rugby team may be deemed to be a better choice (as minimally redun-
dant). Even though it is possible that attributes that look redundant may turn out to be
beneficial, given that people tend to avoid ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961; Treich, 2010),
decisions with a minimal number of redundant attributes make sense.
We present a detailed literature review in Section 8, discussing argumentation-
based decision making, multi-attribute decision-making and case-based reasoning. Ta-
ble 1 provides a summary of existing works on argumentation-based decision making
that are most relevant to ours. From this table, it can be noted that many of these works
are not based on well-defined decision criteria and none of them produces natural lan-
guage explanations systematically for results of decision making. Thus the two main
contribution of this work are:
1. Development of the minimally redundant decision criterion.
2. Introduction of natural language explanations systematically generated from argu-
mentation-based reformulations of decision-making.
The usefulness of these two contributions is validated through an empirical evaluation
(Section 7).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 recaps necessary
background knowledge of ABA and the decision framework that we use as our starting
point, including notions of strongly/weakly dominant decisions. Section 3 introduces
the concept of minimally redundant decisions. Section 4 discusses how to compare
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decisions. Section 5 provides our argumentative counterpart of rational decisions. Sec-
tion 6 gives the algorithmic machinery for generating natural language explanations
for the reasons why certain decisions are better than, or as good as, others. Section 7
presents an empirical evaluation of our method with legal practitioners. Section 8 dis-
cusses related work. Finally, Section 9 summarises the paper and indicates possible
directions for future work.
The paper is a significantly improved and extended version of Zhong et al. (2014).
In particular, Section 6 is a heavily revised version of the same section in Zhong et al.
(2014) by strengthening the algorithmic natural language explanatory part of our con-
tribution, the empirical evaluation in Section 7 is completely new and Section 8 is a
significant extension of the related work section of Zhong et al. (2014).
2. Preliminaries
Our method is based upon Assumption-Based Argumentation (Bondarenko et al.,
1997; Dung et al., 2009; Toni, 2014) and the decision framework of Fan and Toni
(2013). We recap them in this section.
2.1. Assumption-Based Argumentation
An Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) framework is a tuple 〈L,R,A, C〉,
where:
• 〈L,R〉 is a deductive system with language L and rule set R ⊆ {s0 ← s1 ∧
· · · ∧ sm | s0, · · · , sm ∈ L,m ≥ 0};1
• A ⊆ L is a (non-empty) set, referred to as the assumptions; and
• C is a total mapping from A to 2L\{∅}; each element of C(α) is referred to as a
contrary of α.
For a rule ρ = s0 ← s1 ∧ . . . ∧ sm, s0 is the head (denoted Head(ρ) = s0) and
s1 ∧ . . . ∧ sm constitutes the body (denoted Body(ρ) = {s1, . . . , sm}). If m = 0, ρ is
represented as s0 ← and Body(ρ) = ∅. If no assumption occurs in the head of rules in
an ABA framework, then this is flat. All ABA frameworks in this paper are flat.
In ABA, arguments are deductions of claims using rules and supported by assump-
tions, and attacks are directed at assumptions. Concretely, given an ABA framework
〈L,R,A, C〉,
• an argument for claim c ∈ L supported by S ⊆ A (denoted S ` c) is a (finite)
tree with nodes labelled by sentences in L or by the symbol τ ,2 such that the root
is labelled by c, leaves are either τ or assumptions in S, and a non-leaf s has as
many children as the elements in the body of a rule with head s, in a one-to-one
correspondence with the elements of this body; and
1Here ∧ is simply used as a separator and does not have any semantic connotation. In particular, it is
different from any symbol for conjunction occurring in L. Note that in all ABA frameworks in this paper,
sentences in L are simply atoms.
2τ /∈ L stands for “true” and is used to represent the empty body of rules (Dung et al., 2009).
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Figure 1: An admissible dispute tree for Example 1.
• an argument S1 ` c1 attacks an argument S2 ` c2 if and only if c1 ∈ C(α) for
some α ∈ S2.
With arguments and attacks given, several semantics determining sets of arguments
as “acceptable” can be defined. In this paper, we are concerned with the notion of
admissibility, where a set of arguments is admissible if and only if it does not attack
any argument it contains but attacks all arguments attacking it.3 An admissible set
of arguments can be characterised in terms of (abstract) dispute trees as defined by
Dung et al. (2006), i.e., trees with proponent (P) and opponent (O) nodes, labelled
by arguments, which attack the argument in their parent node. Each P-node has all
arguments attacking the argument labelling it as its children, and each O-node has one
child only. If no argument in a dispute tree labels a P-node as well as an O-node, then
the dispute tree is admissible and the set of all arguments labelling P-nodes (called
defence set) is admissible (Dung et al., 2006).
Argumentation computation engines, including proxdd,4 can compute dispute
trees and sets of arguments that are admissible. More specifically, proxdd receives
in input an ABA framework and a sentence, then determines whether or not there is
an argument with that sentence as its claim and, in the set-up for the admissibility se-
mantics, an admissible set of arguments to which that argument belongs, and finally
outputs this admissible set of arguments as well as, in the case of specific choices of
parameters (notably a patient selection function), a dispute tree whose defence set is
that admissible set. The proxdd system is a faithful Prolog implementation of the
X-dispute derivations of Toni (2013) (supporting also computation under other ABA
semantics). We briefly illustrate its output (under the admissibility semantics and a
patient selection function) as well as all the ABA notions with the following simple
example adapted from Toni (2014).
Example 1. Let 〈L,R,A, C〉 be the ABA framework with:5
• R = {p← q ∧ a, q ←, r ← b ∧ c, t←};
• A = {a, b, c}; and
3An argument set As attacks an argument B if and only if some A ∈ As attacks B, and an argument A
attacks an argument set Bs if and only if A attacks some B ∈ Bs.
4robertcraven.org/proarg/
5In this and all other ABA frameworks in the paper we omit to indicate explicitly the L component.
Implicitly, this is always the set of all the sentences occurring in the other components. Here, for example,
L = {a, b, c, p, q, r, s, t}.
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• C : A → 2L \ {∅} is given by: C(a) = {r}, C(b) = {s}, and C(c) = {t}.
Some examples of arguments for this ABA framework are
{a} ` p, {b, c} ` r, ∅ ` t.
The set of arguments A = {∅ ` t, {a} ` p}} is admissible (there are several other
admissible sets, e.g. ∅). This admissible set A is the defence set of the dispute tree
shown in Figure 1, presented in a format similar to the one obtained as output from
proxdd. In the figure, each argument is represented as a rectangle, the argument
claim is denoted by the right inner rectangle and assumptions are denoted by the left
inner rectangle, connected by a diamond-pointed arrow. Arguments supported by the
empty set ∅ of assumptions are denoted by rectangles with a single inner rectangle.
Attacks are denoted by arrows between (claims and assumptions of) outer rectangles
(namely the arguments). Arguments are P orO and are numbered for ease of reference.
2.2. Decision Frameworks
Decision frameworks (Fan and Toni, 2013) capture information used in decision-
making. Specifically, a decision framework is composed of goals, attributes and (al-
ternative) decisions such that decisions have attributes and goals are achieved by at-
tributes. These decisions-have-attributes and goals-are-achieved-by-attributes rela-
tions are specified by two tables. Formally,
• a decision framework is a tuple 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉, with a set of decisions D = {d1,
· · · , dn} (n > 0), a set of attributes A = {a1, · · · , am} (m > 0), a set of goals
G = {g1, · · · , gl} (l > 0), and two tables DA (of size n × m) and GA (of size
l ×m) (we use Xi,j to represent the cell in row i and column j in X ∈ {DA, GA})
such that: (i) every DAi,j is either 1, representing that alternative decision di has
attributes aj , or 0, otherwise; and (ii) every GAi,j is either 1, representing that
goal gi is achieved by attribute aj , or 0, otherwise.
DA and GA share the same column orders. The row numbers of decisions and goals
in DA and GA are the indices of decisions and goals, respectively, whereas the indices of
attributes are defined as the column numbers in both DA and GA. We use DEC and DF
to represent the set of all possible decisions and the set of all possible decision frame-
works, respectively. Note that, in decision frameworks, goals are achieved by single
attributes, but the relationship between goals and attributes is not one-to-one, since dif-
ferent attributes may achieve the same goal and different goals may be achieved by the
same attribute.
Given a decision framework, the relation between decisions and goals can be ob-
tained from DA and GA as follows:
• a decision d ∈ D with row index i in DA achieves a goal g ∈ G with row index
j in GA if and only if there is an attribute a ∈ A with column index k in both DA
and GA, such that DAi,k = 1 and GAj,k = 1.
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Table 2: DA (left) and GA (right) for Example 2, with V1, V2 ∈ {0, 1}
a1 a2
d1 1 0
d2 V1 1
a1 a2
g1 1 0
g2 V2 1
In the remainder of the paper, we will use γ(d) to denote the set of goals achieved by d
(obviously γ(d) ⊆ G). Moreover, unless otherwise specified, df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 ∈
DF is a generic decision framework.
Decision criteria are used to select the best decisions in a decision framework ac-
cording to some criteria. Our work is based upon two decision criteria: strong domi-
nance and weak dominance. Strongly dominant decisions achieve all goals, and the set
of goals achieved by a weakly dominant decision is not a proper subset of the set of
goals achieved by any other decision. Formally,
• d ∈ D is strongly dominant if and only if γ(d) = G; and
• d ∈ D is weakly dominant if and only if @d′ ∈ D\{d} such that γ(d) ⊂ γ(d′).
Note that as jointly shown by Proposition 2 and 3 in Fan and Toni (2013), a strongly
dominant decision is also weakly dominant. This is easy to see as for any strongly
dominant decision d, since d achieves all goals, there is no d′ such that d′ achieves
more goals than d. Therefore, d is also weakly dominant.
Now we illustrates decision frameworks and the two notions of dominant decisions
as follows:
Example 2. Consider the decision framework 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 with decision set D =
{d1, d2}, attribute set A = {a1, a2}, goal set G = {g1, g2}, and tables DA and GA as
given in Table 2. Trivially, if V1 = V2 = 1 then both d1 and d2 are strongly as well as
weakly dominant (they are strongly dominant as they meet both goals; they are weakly
dominant as there is no decision meeting more goals than either of the two). If instead
V1 = V2 = 0 then neither decision is strongly dominant but both are weakly dominant.
3. Minimally Redundant Decisions
In this section, we will take one more factor into consideration when choosing
best decisions: the presence/absence of redundant attributes, and define minimally re-
dundant decisions as (strongly or weakly) dominant decisions with as few redundant
attributes as possible.
3.1. Motivation
Achieving goals is central to rational decision-making, however, goal achievement
alone does not always allow to discriminate amongst decision alternatives, and, futher-
more, it ignores the presence of redundant attributes, which is an important factor in
some decision-making, as illustrated below.
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Table 3: DA (left) and GA (right) for Example 3
a1 a2 a3
d1 1 1 0
d2 1 1 1
a1 a2 a3
g1 1 0 0
g2 0 1 0
Example 3. Consider the decision framework 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 with D= {d1, d2}, A=
{a1, a2, a3}, G = {g1, g2}, and DA and GA as given in Table 3. Let d1 and d2 be two
player candidates for a water polo team, with a1 and a2 representing, respectively,
that a candidate belongs to a swimming club and has asked to join the team, and
a3 representing that a candidate also actively plays rugby. Let g1 and g2 represent,
respectively, strong swimming skills and willingness to participate in water polo. Then,
d1 and d2 are (strongly and weakly) dominant, but d1 may be deemed a better decision,
since a3 is redundant (and potentially harmful) towards the achievement of the goals.
It is worth noting that the concept of redundant attributes is specific to pre-defined
goals in the sense that the existence of some attributes can be harmful when considering
decisions achieving those goals. For instance, with respect to a set of goals G1, some
attributes A are redundant; yet there may exist a different set of goals G2 such that
with respect to G2, the same attributes A are not redundant. Moreover, a decision
framework can be viewed as an information store, such that it is constructed to include
as much relevant information as possible. Thus, it is the task of a decision criterion to
select the “best” decisions from a given decision framework, and best decisions may
change if new goals are considered and re-writing the information store is needed.
The concept of redundant attributes is also useful in case-based reasoning, because
the most relevant cases to a new case can be viewed as the ones with “fewest” redundant
attributes (i.e., as accurate as possible) as illustrated by the following medical literature
search example, adapted from Fan et al. (2013).
Example 4. In medical research, one sometimes faces the problem of choosing which
medical studies to base a diagnosis or a treatment on, for a given patient. This can
be viewed as a decision making problem and our techniques can be used to solve it.
Assume that we have identified 4 randomised clinical trials on the treatment of brain
metastases.6 The decisions (D) of our model are choices to use a given paper in a
diagnosis or treatment. Each literature paper describes a two-arm trial. We extract a
list of representative trial design criteria and patient characteristics from these papers.
These criteria and characteristics can be considered as attributes (A) of decisions.
Assume that the relations between papers and trial criteria / characteristics are
as given in Table 4 (DA). Here, a “1” in row k, column i should be interpreted as
“the trial reported in paper pk has criterion / characteristics i”. A blank means that
the corresponding criterion / characteristics is either not reported or not met by the
particular paper. The list of characteristics are: over 18 years old, with 1 metastases,
with 2 metastases, with more than 2 metastases, having endocardial cushion defect
(ECD), with performance status 0 or 1 (PS1), and with performance status 2 (PS2).
6These are real published medical literature. The PMID of each paper can be found in Fan et al. (2013).
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For instance, the first row should be read as: the trial reported in paper p1 includes
patients over 18 years old, with 1, 2 or more brain metastases, with performance status
either 0 or 1 (PS1).
Table 4: Paper / Trial Characteristics (DA)
> 18 1m 2m > 2m ECD PS 0, 1 PS 2
p1 1 1 1 1 1
p2 1 1 1
p3 1 1 1 1 1 1
p4 1 1 1 1
Goal 1 1 1
Since the aim is to find medical papers for a particular patient, we view properties
of the given patient as goals (G). In this setting, “good” decisions are medical papers
that better match with the particular patient’s properties. We present relations between
patient’s properties and trial characteristics in Table 5 (GA). The occurrence of a “1”
in the table represents trial characteristics meeting patient properties. For instance,
the sample patient shown in Table 5 has four properties: he is 64 years old, has three
metastases, has no ECD, and has a performance status of 1.
Amongst the four papers p1, . . . , p4, we observe that:
• Paper p2 does not match with the patient’s properties as it does not contains
studies for adult patients, it does not report the number of metastases its patients’
have, and its patients have ECD.
• Paper p4 does not match with the patient’s properties either, as its patients have
performance statuses other than 0 to 2.
• Thus, we need to choose between p1 and p3 for the best match. We argue that p1
is a better choice for the specific patient as its study is solely focused on patients
with performance status 0 and 1 and does not include patients with more severe
conditions such as performance status 2. The “tighter” fit of p1 makes it more
suitable to our target patient than p3, i.e., p3 having the attribute PS2 makes
it less desirable, as PS2 can be deemed redundant (with respect to this specific
goal patient).
The concept of redundant attributes is generic, as further shown in the following
legal example, which we will use throughout the paper to illustrate our work.
Table 5: Patient Properties / Trial Characteristics (GA)
> 18 1m 2m > 2m ECD PS 0, 1 PS 2
Age64 1
3m 1
PS 1 1
Lung
10
Table 6: A fragment of the Past Cases Characteristics
Index No. Attr. a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 Sentence
d1 245 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1y+¥1k
d2 97 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 10y+3y+¥10k
d3 420 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 6m+¥1k
d4 96 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3y+¥3k
d5 48 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6m+¥1k
d6 751 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 5y+¥5k
d7 801 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 6m+¥1k
d8 1962 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 7y+¥7k
d9 389 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 4m+¥1k
d10 686 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 6m+¥1k
Goal case 355 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 10y+3y+¥10k
Example 5. In the legal domain, when jury members, judges, lawyers or other involved
parties review a new law case, it is common practice that they search for and examine
similar past cases so that they can use the (court) sentence of the past cases as a basis
for estimating the outcome of the new case (Kronman, 1990). Identifying most similar
past cases can be formulated in decision-making terms, where past cases are seen as
alternative decisions. The suitability of each past case can be computed based on the
sentence of the new case: the closer the sentence to the ones for the past cases, the
more rational the choice of these past cases as similar. Table 6 summarises the eleven
real cases, all concerning theft, from the Nanhai District People’s Court in the city of
Foshan, Guangdong Province, China. Each case has:
• a number of attributes, i.e., a1, · · · , a9, standing for “older than 18”, “age be-
tween 16 and 18”, “burglary”, “repeatedly”, (value of goods) “large amount”,
“huge amount”, “extremely huge amount”, “goods found” and “accessory”,
respectively; and
• a sentence, e.g. “1 year of imprisonment with ¥1,000 fine” (represented in Ta-
ble 6 as “1y+¥1,000”) or “10 years of imprisonment, 3 years deprivation of po-
litical right with ¥10,000 fine” (represented in Table 6 as “10y+3y+¥10,000”).
For each case, the value of an attribute can either be 1 or 0, representing the case
having the attribute or not, respectively. For example, the row indexed d1 in Table 6
represents case No. 245, where:
the defendant, aged between 16 and 18 (a2), stole repeatedly (a4), and the
value of the stolen goods was huge (a6); and the resulting sentence was 1
year imprisonment with ¥1,000 fine.
From this point forward, we view case No. 355 (indexed Goal case in Table 6) as new
(thus ignoring its sentence). In this case,
the defendant was older than 18 (a1), the value of the stolen goods was
extremely huge (a7), and the stolen goods were found (a8).
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Table 7: GA table for Example 6.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9
g1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
g2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
g3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Case No. 97, where
the defendant was older than 18 (a1), the value of the stolen goods was
extremely huge (a7), and the resulting sentence was 10 years of imprison-
ment, 3 years deprivation of political right plus ¥10,000 fine,
can be deemed to be the past case most similar to case No. 355 as case No. 97 is
the case matching most attributes of case No. 355 while also exhibiting the fewest
redundant attributes (as case No. 97 only deviates from case No. 355 on a8). Such
conclusion is validated by the fact that both case No. 355 and case No. 97 have the
same sentence.
We can formalise the above example as a decision framework as follows:
Example 6 (Example 5 as a decision framework). The decision problem of determining
which one, amongst cases labelled d1, · · · , d10 in Table 6, are most similar to the
goal case (i.e., the new case No. 355) can be formalised as a decision framework
df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 in which
• D = {d1, · · · , d10};
• A = {a1, · · · , a9};
• G = {g1, g2, g3}, where g1, g2 and g3 stand for “older than 18”, “extremely
huge amount” and “goods found”, respectively, and amount to attributes a1, a7
and a8, respectively, that the goal case has;
• DA is Table 6 without case No. 355 and dropping the column with the sentences;
and
• GA is Table 7.
No strongly dominant decisions exist here as no decisions can achieve all three goals
g1, g2, and g3. Thus, we need to rely on weak dominance to make a decision. Several
weakly dominant decisions exist, as indeed decisions d2 (No. 97), d3 (No. 420), d4 (No.
96), d5 (No. 48), d6 (No. 751), d7 (No. 801), d8 (No. 1962), and d10 (No. 686) are all
weakly dominant. However, notice that the goal case (i.e., case No. 355) is achieved
by having three attributes a1, a7, and a8. Thus, to achieve the goals, decisions with
these three attributes are sufficient. The remaining attributes are actually redundant in
the sense that they do not contribute to achieving any goal. For instance, both d2 (case
No. 97) and d8 (case No. 1962) achieve two goals g1 and g2. Yet, d2 has no redundant
attributes, whereas d8 has attribute a9 satisfying no goals. Therefore, we conclude that
case No. 97 is more similar to the goal case.
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3.2. Redundant attributes and minimal redundancy
In settings such as the ones outlined in Examples 3–6, having the fewest redun-
dant attributes is an important property for best (most rational) decisions. Indeed, we
can use the presence/absence of redundant attributes as a filter to further distinguish
amongst (strongly or weakly) dominant decisions. Let us first formalise the notion of
redundant attribute as follows:
Definition 1. Let α ∈ A and i be the column index of α in DA and GA. Then α is a
redundant attribute if and only if ∀g ∈ G, if g has row index j in GA, then GAj,i 6= 1.
The set of redundant attributes decision d has is denoted as λ(d).
Here, α ∈ λ(d) indicates that d has attribute α but α fulfils no goals in G. For our
water polo example (i.e., Example 3), since GA1,3 = 0 and GA2,3 = 0, a3 is redundant
and λ(d1) = ∅, λ(d2) = {a3}. For our legal example (i.e., Example 6), since
GA1,9 = 0, GA2,9 = 0 and GA3,9 = 0, a9 is a redundant attribute. Similarly, a2, · · · , a6
are redundant. Then, λ(d1) = {a2, a4, a6}, λ(d2) = ∅ and so on.
Minimally redundant decisions have fewest redundant attributes with respect to set
inclusion. Formally:
Definition 2. A decision d ∈ D is minimally redundant in 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 ∈ DF if and
only if @d′ ∈ D such that λ(d′) ⊂ λ(d).
In other words, a decision d is minimally redundant if and only if there is no other
decision d′ such that the set of redundant attributes that d′ has is a proper subset of
the set of redundant attributes that d has. In Example 3, it is easy to see that d1 (the
candidate not playing rugby) is minimally redundant. In Example 6, it is easy to see
that d2 (case No. 97) is minimally redundant.
Minimal redundancy only concerns the relation between decisions and attributes,
hence it is orthogonal to dominance (see Section 2), concerning the relation between
decisions and goals. Therefore, we will identify decisions with a two-step process:
we first identify all dominant decisions, and then, amongst all dominant decisions, we
select the minimally redundant ones. To refine decisions on grounds of redundancy
(and thus support the second step of the aforementioned process), we introduce sub-
frameworks, as given below:
Definition 3. Given D′ ⊆ D, the sub-framework of df with respect to D′ is a decision
framework 〈D′, A, G, DA′, GA〉 such that DA′ is the restriction of DA that contains only
rows for di such that di ∈ D′.
We subsequently combine the concepts of strong/weak dominance and minimal
redundancy below:
Definition 4. Given df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 ∈ DF , d ∈ D is
• Minimally Redundant Strongly Dominant (MRSD) if and only if d is minimally
redundant in dfs, the sub-framework of df with respect to the set of all strongly
dominant decisions;
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• Minimally Redundant Weakly Dominant (MRWD) if and only if d is minimally
redundant in dfw, the sub-framework of df with respect to the set of all weakly
dominant decisions.
Thus, we adopt a lexicographic approach, selecting first the (weakly or strongly)
dominant decisions, and then, amongst those, the minimally redundant decisions.
As an illustration, in Example 3, both decisions are strongly dominant and d1 (the
candidate not playing rugby) is MRSD. In Example 6, there are no MRSD decisions,
as there are no strongly dominant decisions, and d2 (case No. 97) is MRWD as this
case is weakly dominant and has no redundant attributes. There are no other MRWD
decisions in Example 6.
It is easy to see that, if there exists any strongly dominant decision, then the set of
MRSD decisions and the set of MRWD decisions coincide. Formally, we have:
Lemma 1. Let Ds, Dms, and Dmw be the sets of all strongly dominant, MRSD, and
MRWD decisions, respectively. If Ds 6= ∅ then Dms = Dmw.
Proof. Let dfs be the sub-framework of df with respect to Ds, and dfw be the sub-
framework of df with respect to Dw, the set of all weakly dominant decisions. Since
Ds 6= ∅, we have Ds = Dw (by Proposition 4 in Fan and Toni (2013)). Thus, we have
dfw = dfs. So the lemma holds. 2
4. Comparing Decisions
So far, we have introduced two kinds of minimally redundant decisions (i.e., MRSD
and MRWD decisions), adding to two existing kinds of rational decisions (i.e., the
strongly dominant and weakly dominant decisions of Fan and Toni (2013)). Thus, in
this section, we can formally discuss how to compare decisions in different categories
(i.e., we will present a mechanism to rank them).
We first define the better-than relation between decisions, given as follows:
Definition 5. For any d, d′ ∈ D, d is better than d′, denoted d  d′, if and only if:
(i) d is strongly dominant and d′ is not strongly dominant, or
(ii) d is weakly dominant and d′ is not weakly dominant, or
(iii) d is MRSD and d′ is strongly dominant and d′ is not MRSD, or
(iv) d is MRWD and d′ is weakly dominant and d′ is not MRWD.
We also say that d is as good as d′, denoted d∼ d′, if and only if neither d d′ nor
d′d.
The above definition is given with the following intuition: non-strongly/non-weakly
dominant decisions are the least favourable decisions; minimally redundant strongly/weakly
dominant decisions are the most favourable decisions; and two decisions are equally
good unless one is more favourable than the other.
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Note that if a non-empty set of strongly dominant decisions D exists, then D is the
set of weakly dominant decisions as well (by Proposition 4 in (Fan and Toni, 2013)).
In other words, in this case, there does not exist a decision that is weakly dominant but
not strongly dominant. Therefore, if there exists an non-empty set of strongly dominant
decisions, then by Definition 5 any strongly dominant decision is as good as any weakly
dominant decision (as well as any other strongly dominant decision).
As an illustration, for Example 6, since d2 (case No. 97) is the only MRWD and d8
(case No. 1962) is weakly dominant, we have d2  d8 by Definition 5(iv).
The following three propositions sanction an important result: for any pair of de-
cisions in our decision framework, we can always compare them using the notions of
better than and as good as we defined. We start with  being transitive and ∼ being
an equivalence relation on D, as shown below:
Proposition 1. For any d, d′, d′′ ∈ D, if d′′  d′ and d′  d, then d′′  d.
Proof. By Definition 5, there are only five possibilities satisfying d′′  d′ and d′ 
d, so we check them one by one. (i) In the case that d′′ is strongly dominant, d′ is
weakly dominant but not strongly dominant, and d is not weakly dominant, we have
d′′ weakly dominant by Proposition 4 in Fan and Toni (2013). Hence, we have d′′  d
by Definition 5(ii). (ii) In the case that d′′ is MRSD, d′ is strongly dominant but not
MRSD, and d is not strongly dominant, we have d′′ strongly dominant by Definition 4.
Hence, we have d′′  d by Definition 5(i). (iii) In the case that d′′ is MRSD, d′ is
strongly dominant but not MRSD, and d is not weakly dominant, we have d′′ weakly
dominant by Definition 4 and Proposition 4 in Fan and Toni (2013). Since d is not
weakly dominant, we have d′′  d by Definition 5(ii). (iv) In the case that d′′ is
MRWD, d′ is strongly dominant but not MRWD, and d is not strongly dominant, we
have d′′ MRSD by Lemma 1. Hence, we have d′′  d by Definitions 4 and 5(i). (v) In
the case that d′′ is MRWD, d′ is weakly dominant but not MRWD, and d is not weakly
dominant, we have d′′ weakly dominant by Definition 4. Hence, we have d′′  d by
Definition 5(ii). 2
Proposition 2. ∼ is an equivalence relation on D.
Proof. It is trivial to prove that ∼ is reflexive and symmetric. For transitivity, we have
∀d1, d2, d3 ∈ D, if d1 ∼ d2 and d2 ∼ d3, by Definition 5, we have d1 6 d2, d2 6 d1,
d2 6 d3, and d3 6 d2. Suppose d1 6∼ d3, we can have either d1  d3 or d3  d1. (i)
Since d1  d3, by Definition 5, there are four sub-cases: (a) d1 is strongly dominant but
d3 is not, (b) d1 is weakly dominant but d3 is not, (c) d1 is MRSD and d3 is strongly
dominant but not MRSD, and (d) d1 is MRWD and d3 is weakly dominant but not
MRWD. Here we just consider the first sub-case, the others can be proven similarly.
Since d1 6 d2, we have that d2 is strongly dominant, which leads to d2  d3 by
Definition 5. Contradiction. (ii) Similarly, the case of d3  d1 can be proven. 2
Given the quotient set D/∼ of all equivalence classes, we can define a binary rela-
tion ≥ on D/∼ as follows:
Definition 6. Given d ∈ D, let [d] denote the equivalence class to which d belongs. For
any [d′], [d′′] ∈ D/∼, [d′] ≥ [d′′] if and only if d′  d′′ or d′ ∼ d′′.
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Note that [d′] = [d′′] if and only if d′ ∼ d′′.
Proposition 3. ≥ is a total order on D/∼.
Proof. To establish this result, it must be shown that ≥ is anti-symmetric, transitive
and total. (i) Anti-symmetry. For any d1, d2 ∈ D, assume [d1] ≥ [d2] and [d2] ≥ [d1].
We then need to prove [d1] = [d2]. Since [d1] ≥ [d2], then d1  d2 or d1 ∼ d2.
For the former, we have d2 6 d1. Since [d2] ≥ [d1], we have d2 ∼ d1, which leads
to [d1] = [d2]. For the latter, [d1] = [d2] certainly. (ii) Transitivity follows from
Propositions 1 and 2. (iii) Totality can be proven by contradiction. Suppose there exist
[d1] and [d2] (where d1, d2 ∈ D) such that [d1] 6≥ [d2] and [d2] 6≥ [d1]. By Definition 6,
we have d1 6 d2, d1 6∼ d2, d2 6 d1, and d2 6∼ d1. Since d1 6 d2 and d2 6 d1, we
have d1 ∼ d2 and d2 ∼ d1 by Definition 5. Contradiction. 2
The above proposition is the main result in this section. It sanctions that better
than or as good as given in Definition 5 can be used to compare any two decisions in
a decision framework. The comparison is core in our method for explaining decisions
in Section 6. This method relies upon the mapping from a decision framework and a
decision criterion to an ABA framework, given next.
5. Argumentative Counterpart of MRSD and MRWD Decisions
In this section, we present a mapping that takes decision frameworks and gives
ABA frameworks so that the two kinds of minimally redundant decisions presented in
Section 3.2 can be computed by finding admissible sets of arguments. This mapping
also gives a mechanism for producing dispute trees that explain best decisions argu-
mentatively and that will be used in Section 6 to explainin natural language why one
decision is better than or as good as another, in the sense of Definition 5.
Concretely, given a decision criterion (amongst MRSD and MRWD) and a decision
framework, an equivalent ABA framework is constructed.
Now we start with defining the ABA mapping for MRSD decisions as follows:7
Definition 7. The MRSD ABA framework for 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 is 〈L,R,A, C〉, where:
7Note that we could have given a single ABA framework for both MRSD and MRSW decisions, amount-
ing to the union of the ABA framework for MRSD decisions (Definition 7) and the ABA framework for
MRSW decisions (Definition 8). However, for clarity of presentation and readability, we have opted for two
separate definitions instead.
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• R consists of the following rules (and nothing else):8
for each d ∈ D, a ∈ A such that d has a: hasAttr(d, a)← (1)
for each g ∈ G, a ∈ A such that g is satisfied by a: satBy(g, a)← (2)
de(D,A)← hasAttr(D,A) ∧ redundant(A) (3)
notRedundant(A)← satBy(G,A) (4)
notMSD(D)← sd(D′) ∧ worse(D,D′) ∧ nWorse(D′, D) (5)
nSD(D)← nMet(D,G) (6)
met(D,G)← hasAttr(D,A) ∧ satBy(G,A) (7)
worse(D′, D)← de(D′, A) ∧ nAttr(D,A) (8)
• the set of assumptions A is given by
A ={ms(d), sd(d), redundant(a), nAttr(d, a) | d ∈ D, a ∈ A}∪
{nWorse(d, d′)|d, d′ ∈ D, d 6= d′} ∪ {nMet(d, g) | d ∈ D, g ∈ G}. (9)
• C : A → 2L \ {∅} is given by: for each d, d′ ∈ D (such that d 6= d′), a ∈ A,
g ∈ G:
C(ms(d)) = {notMSD(d), nSD(d)}, C(sd(d)) = {nSD(d)}, (10)
C(redundant(a)) = {notRedundant(a)}, C(nAttr(d, a)) = {hasAttr(d, a)},
(11)
C(nWorse(d, d′)) = {worse(d, d′)}, C(nMet(d, g)) = {met(d, g)}. (12)
The intuition behind the above definition is as follows. A decision d can always
be assumed to be MRSD, since ms(d) is an assumption (see (9)). This assumption
can then be debated (argumentatively) by assessing arguments for the contraries of
this assumption, nSD(d) and notMSD(d) (see (10)). Indeed, d is not MRSD under
either of two conditions: (i) d is not strongly dominant (nSD(d), see (10)), or (ii) d
is not minimally redundant (notMSD(d), see (10)). According to (5), a decision d
is not minimally redundant (notMSD(d)) if there exists some other decision d′ such
that d′ is strongly dominant (sd(d′)) and d contains some redundant attribute which d′
does not (worse(d, d′)) and d′ does not contain any more redundant attributes than d
(nWorse(d′, d)). According to (6), any decision d is not strongly dominant (nSD(d)) if
there exists a goal g that d does not fulfil (nMet(d, g)). Since sd(d) is an assumption (see
(9)), d can always be assumed to be strongly dominant, subject to debate, amounting
to assessing arguments for its contrary nSD(d) (see (10)), that d is actually not strongly
dominant, namely (by (6)) that d does not achieve some goal g (nMet(d, g)). Again,
given that nMet(d, g) is an assumption (see (9)) with contrary met(d, g) (see (12)), the
8We sometimes use schemata with variables (D,D′, A,G) to represent compactly all rules that can be
obtained by instantiating the variables as follows: D,D′ are instantiated to decisions, A to attributes, G to
goals.
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Table 8: DA (left) and GA (right) for Example 7
a
d1 1
d2 0
a
g 1
acceptance of nMet(d, g) is subject to checking whether or not d has some attribute
satisfying g (see (7)). The other assumptions, contraries and rules in the given ABA
framework can be understood similarly. Overall, the MRSD ABA framework can be
used to determine whether or not a decision d is MRSD by checking whether or not the
assumption ms(d) can be accepted.
The following example illustrates the notion of MRSD ABA framework for a very
simple decision framework.
Example 7. Consider the decision framework df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉 with D={d1, d2},
A= {a}, G= {g}, and tables DA and GA given in Table 8. The MRSD ABA framework
for df is 〈L,R,A, C〉, where:
• R consists of
hasAttr(d1, a)←,
satBy(g, a)←,
de(d1, a)← hasAttr(d1, a) ∧ Credundant(a),
de(d2, a)← hasAttr(d2, a) ∧ Credundant(a),
notRedundant(a)← satBy(g, a),
notMSD(d1)← sd(d2) ∧ worse(d1, d2) ∧ nWorse(d2, d1),
notMSD(d2)← sd(d1) ∧ worse(d2, d1) ∧ nWorse(d1, d2),
nSD(d1)← nMet(d1, g),
nSD(d2)← nMet(d2, g),
met(d1, g)← hasAttr(d1, a) ∧ satBy(g, a),
met(d2, g)← hasAttr(d2, a) ∧ satBy(g, a),
worse(d1, d2)← de(d1, a) ∧ nAttr(d2, a),
worse(d2, d1)← de(d2, a) ∧ nAttr(d1, a).
• A = {ms(d1),ms(d2), sd(d1), sd(d2), redundant(a), nAttr(d1, a), nAttr(d2, a),
nWorse(d1, d2), nWorse(d2, d1), nMet(d1, g), nMet(d2, g)}.
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met(d1,g)
P: 7
nMet(d1,g)
O: 6
nSD(d1)
nMet(d2,g)
P: 11
nSD(d2) sd(d2)
O: 10
deviate(a)
nAttr(d2,a)
nWorse(d2,d1)
notMSD(d1)
ms(d1)
P: 1
ms(d1)
Figure 2: Admissible dispute tree for Example 7.
• C : A → 2L \ {∅} is given by:
C(ms(d1)) = {notMSD(d1), nSD(d1)}, C(ms(d2)) = {notMSD(d2), nSD(d2)},
C(sd(d1)) = {nSD(d1)}, C(sd(d2)) = {nSD(d2)},
C(redundant(a)) = {notRedundant(a)},
C(nAttr(d1, a)) = {hasAttr(d1, a)}, C(nAttr(d2, a)) = {hasAttr(d2, a)},
C(nWorse(d1, d2)) = {worse(d1, d2)}, C(nWorse(d2, d1)) = {worse(d2, d1)},
C(nMet(d1, g)) = {met(d1, g)}, C(nMet(d2, g)) = {met(d2, g)}.
Given this ABA framework, ms(d1) is the claim of an argument in an admissible set,
which is the defence set of the admissible dispute tree (adapted from the output of
proxdd) in Figure 2. The root argument of the tree (right-most rectangle labelled P:1)
claims that d1 is a MRSD decision. This claim is attacked by two different arguments
(rectangles labelled O:6 and O:10 in Figure 2) as follows:
• O:6 represents an objection against d1 on grounds that it does not achieve goal
g; and
• O:10 represents an objection against d1 on grounds that d2 is strongly dominant
and does not have presumably, the redundant attribute a.
These two attacks are both counter-attacked by other arguments (rectangles labelled
P:7 and P:11, respectively) as follows:
• P:7 represents that d1 achieves g; and
• P:11 represents that d2 is not strongly dominant as it does not achieve g.
Neither of these counter-attacks can be further attacked, and so the defence set of the
dispute tree is admissible. Note that the “wrong” assumptions in O:6 and O:10 are
essential to identify, via the counter-attacks P:7 and P:11, the reasons why d1 is a
MRSD decision and ms(d1) is a legitimate assumption (in an admissible set).
This example illustrates how the mapping onto ABA captures minimally redun-
dant strong dominance by means of admissibility. In general, the following theorem
gives the result that the mapping onto MRSD ABA frameworks gives an equivalent
re-formulation for MRSD decisions.
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Theorem 1. Let AF be the MRSD ABA framework for df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉. Then,
for each d ∈ D, d is MRSD if and only if {ms(d)} ` ms(d) belongs to an admissible set
of arguments in AF .
Proof. Let S be the set of all strongly dominant decisions and df ′ be the sub-framework
of df with respect to S. Since both nSD(d) and notMSD(d) are contraries of ms(d),
the attacks against argument {ms(d)} ` ms(d) have any of the following forms (∀d′ ∈
D\{d}, g ∈ G, a ∈ A):
{nMet(d, g)} ` nSD(d), (13)
{nWorse(d′, d), sd(d′), nAttr(d′, a), redundant(a)} ` notMSD(d). (14)
(=⇒) With d being MRSD, we need to prove that ∀d′ ∈ D\{d}, g ∈ G, a ∈ A,
arguments (13) and (14) are counter-attacked. Since d is MRSD, there are arguments
for met(d, g) of the form ∅ ` met(d, g), so argument (13) is counter-attacked by
arguments supported by empty sets of assumptions. For each d′ ∈ S\{d}, with d
being MRSD, by Definitions 4 and 2, there are two cases to be considered: (i) In
the case of λ(d) ⊆ λ(d′), there are arguments for hasAttr(d′, a). Hence, argument
(14) is also counter-attacked by arguments supported by the empty set of assump-
tions. (ii) In the case that ∃a′ ∈ A such that a′ 6∈ λ(d) ∧ a ∈ λ(d′), there are argu-
ments for worse(d′, d). Hence, argument (14) is counter-attacked by arguments of the
form {deviate(a), nAttr(d, a)} ` worse(d, d). These arguments are defended since
a′ 6∈ λ(d) ∧ a∈ λ(d′). While ∀d′ 6∈ S\{d}, there are arguments for nSD(d′), so argu-
ment (14) is also counter-attacked by arguments of the form {nMet(d, g)} ` nSD(d).
These arguments are not attacked since d is not strongly dominant and there exists goal
g which d does not achieve.
(⇐=) The attacks against argument {ms(d)} ` ms(d) have form (13) or (14) above.
If {ms(d)} ` ms(d) belongs to an admissible set in AF , then these attacks are all
counter-attacked. Therefore, d is strongly dominant and for each ∀d′ ∈ D\{d}, there
are arguments for worse(d′, d) or nSD(d′) or hasAttr(d′, a) or notRedundant(a) (where
a ∈ A). Then ∀d′ ∈ S\{d}, ∃a ∈ A such that a ∈ λ(d′) ∧ a 6∈ λ(d) or λ(d) ⊆ λ(d′).
Hence, d is MRSD. 2
Theorem 1 sanctions that the mapping, given in Definition 7, from decision frame-
works to MRSD ABA frameworks is sound and complete in the sense that MRSD
decisions in a decision framework correspond to arguments in admissible sets in the
MRSD ABA framework. The following corollary states that strongly dominant deci-
sions in a decision framework also correspond to arguments in admissible sets in the
corresponding MRSD ABA frameworks.
Corollary 1. Let AF be the MRSD ABA framework for df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉. Then
for each d ∈ D, d is strongly dominant if and only if {sd(d)} ` sd(d) is in an admissible
set of arguments in AF .
Proof. This result can be shown easily from the proof of Theorem 1. 2
As we will see in Section 6, this result is useful when we compare decisions ac-
cording to the several criteria defined in Section 4.
The problem of identifying MRWD decisions can be also mapped onto the problem
of computing admissible sets of arguments in an ABA framework, given next.
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Definition 8. Let 〈L,R,A, C〉 be the MRSD ABA framework for df = 〈D, A, G, DA, GA〉.
The MRWD ABA framework for df is 〈L,R′,A′, C′〉, where:
• R′ is obtained from R in Definition 7 by replacing rule schemata (5) and (6)
with rule schemata:
notMWD(D)← wd(D′) ∧ worse(D,D′) ∧ nWorse(D′, D),
nWD(D)← met(D′, G) ∧ nMet(D,G) ∧ nMore(D,D′),
more(D,D′)← met(D,G) ∧ nMet(D′, G).
• A′=Aw ∪ {nMore(d, d′) | d, d′ ∈ D, d 6= d′}, where Aw is A in Definition 7
with (for any d ∈ D) ms(d) replaced by mw(d) and sd(d) replaced by wd(d).
• C : A′ → 2L \ {∅} is given by: for any d, d′ ∈ D (such that d 6= d′):
C′(nMore(d, d′)) = {more(d, d′)},
C′(mw(d)) = {notMWD(d), nWD(d)},
C′(wd(d)) = {nWD(d)}, (10′)
and C′(α) = C(α), with C as in Definition 7, for all other assumptions in A′.
Note that (10′) in the above definition is obtained by replacing ms(d), nSD(d),
notMSD(d), and sd(d) in (10) in Definition 7 by mw(d), nWD(d), notMWD(d), and
wd(d), respectively.
The theorem below sanctions a form of soundness and completeness for MRWD
ABA frameworks:
Theorem 2. Let AF be the MRWD ABA framework for df . Then for each d ∈ D, d is
MRWD if and only if {mw(d)} ` mw(d) belongs to an admissible set of arguments in
AF .
This theorem follows from Definitions 4 and 8 as well as the definition of admis-
sibility in ABA (see Section 2). Its proof is omitted since it is very similar to that of
Theorem 1.
We illustrate the use of Theorem 2 in the context of our legal example, as follows:
Example 8 (Example 6 continued). Given the MRWD ABA framework for our legal df
(obtained as per Definition 8), {mw(d2)} ` mw(d2) belongs to an admissible set, as
shown by the fragment, given in Figure 3, of an admissible dispute tree adapted from
the output of proxdd. This tree illustrates the explanation aspect of the ABA mapping.
The root argument of the tree (right-most rectangle labelled P:1) claims that d2 (case
No. 97) is MRWD. This claim is attacked by three different arguments (rectangles
labelled O:23 - O:25), giving reasons why d2 may not be MRWD as follows:
• (O:23) d8 (case No. 1962) is better than d2 (case No. 97);
• (O:24) d2 is not weakly dominant since d8 achieves goal g1 (i.e., older than 18)
that is not achieved by d2; and
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met(d2,g1)
P: 33
nMet(d2,g1)
O: 24
met(d8,g1) nWD(d2)
nMore(d2,d8)
met(d2,g2)
P: 34
nMet(d2,g2)
O: 25
met(d8,g2) nWD(d2)
nMore(d2,d8)
worse(d8,d2)
P: 32
nAttr(d2,a9)
deviate(a9)
wd(d8)
O: 23
nWorse(d8,d2) notMWD(d2)
worse(d2,d8)
mw(d2)
P: 1
mw(d2)
Figure 3: A fragment of an admissible dispute tree for our legal example.
• (O:25) d2 is not weakly dominant since d8 achieves goal g2 (i.e., extremely huge
amount) that is not achieved by d2.
These three arguments are counter-attacked by other arguments (rectangles labelled
P:32, P:33, and P:34, respectively), as follows:
• (P:32) d8 has redundant attribute a9 (i.e., accessory) but d2 does not, so d8 is
worse than d2;
• (P:33 / P:34) d2 achieves goal g1 / g2 (respectively).
Indeed, as we have seen earlier, case No. 97 (d2) is the case that is most similar to
the goal case, because it is the only MRWD decision. Note that only a fragment of the
dispute tree is shown here. The full tree contains several other arguments of the form:
{nMet(d2, g),met(d, g), nMore(d2, d)} ` nWD(d2),
{wd(d), nWorse(d, d2),worse(d2, d)} ` notMWD(d2),
for various d ∈ D but d 6= d2, and g ∈ G. These arguments are all counter-attacked by
arguments similar to the ones shown as P:32, P:33, and P:34.
As shown in the examples, the ABA reformulations of the various decision criteria
we propose allows us to use dispute trees as explanations for why these criteria sanction
some decisions as best. In addition, these dispute trees pave the way towards linguistic
explanations, as defined next.
6. Natural Language Explanation
In addition to giving a comprehensive explanation to best decisions, dispute trees
can be used to provide explanations when comparing decisions, e.g. for giving answers
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Table 9: Abbreviations for strings.
Abbreviation Full string
eq(d, d′) d is as good as d′
better(d, d′) d is better than d′
bmall(d, d′) because both d and d′ meet all goals
fmall(d, d′) because d (the first decision) meets all goals but d′ (the second decision)
does not
bmnot met(d, d′) because both d and d′ meet goals not met by the other
fmmore(d, d′) because d (the first decision) meets more goals than d′ (the second deci-
sion)
nmmost(d, d′) because neither d nor d′ meet most goals, moreover, d does not achieve
more goals than d′, and vice versa
bfewest ra(d, d′) because both d and d′ have fewest redundant attributes
ffewer ra(d, d′) because d (the first decision) has fewer redundant attributes than d′ (the
second decision)
to questions such as Why is a decision d more preferred to another d′? Answering such
questions transparently is important for human decision makers as it brings trust to the
computer system recommended decisions. In this section, we present an algorithm to
generate natural language explanations by extracting information from dispute trees.
The explanations that we generate answer pairwise comparison questions. The pre-
sented algorithm is derived from the decision ranking scheme presented in Section 4,
in the sense that it justifies a decision as better than or as good as another if the former
is higher or the same in that ranking.
Based on our mapping from decision framework to ABA in Section 5, good de-
cisions in different categories, e.g. MRSD or MRWD, are accompanied by different
corresponding ABA frameworks. Dispute trees with, as roots, arguments with claims
ms(d) or mw(d) contain all the required information for pairwise comparisons.
Algorithm 1 shows the main process for generating text for explaining the rationale
for decision-making, with Algorithms 2 and 3 defining subprocedures used in Algo-
rithm 1. In defining these algorithms, we adopt the following conventions, with respect
to the relevant ABA framework: (i) a sentence s ∈ L is admissible if and only if s is the
claim of an argument in some admissible set; (ii) the defence set of a sentence s ∈ L
is the defence set of an admissible dispute tree, the root of which is an argument with
claim s; (iii) ∀s ∈ L such that s is admissible, there is a total order over the admissible
dispute trees, the root of which is an argument with claim s, and DT(s) denotes the first
admissible dispute tree according to this order (we will refer to DT(s) as the “chosen”
dispute tree for s); and (iv) + represents string concatenation.
Moreover, we will make use of the abbreviations for strings given in Table 9. Fur-
ther, the algorithms make use of natural language translations of the support of argu-
ments, defined as follows:
• Given an argument for nSD(d) labelled P : x in a chosen dispute tree, when its
support contains assumption nMet(d, g), nl-Support-for-nSD(d, P : x) denotes
“decision d does not achieve goal g”.
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Algorithm 1 Comparison between decisions d and d′.
1: if ms(d) is admissible in the MRSD ABA framework then
2: COMPARE1(d, d′, DT(ms(d)))
3: else if mw(d) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
4: COMPARE2(d, d′, DT(mw(d)))
5: else if sd(d) is admissible in the MRSD ABA framework then
6: if ms(d′) is admissible in the MRSD ABA framework then
7: COMPARE1(d′, d, DT(ms(d′)))
8: else if sd(d′) is admissible in the MRSD ABA framework then
9: output eq(d, d′) + bmall(d, d′) + “.”
10: else
11: output better(d, d′) + fmall(d, d′) + “. For example: ”+
nl-Support-for-nSD(d′, P : 1) + “.”
12: end if
13: else if wd(d) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
14: if mw(d′) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
15: COMPARE2(d′, d, DT(mw(d′)))
16: else if wd(d′) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
17: output eq(d, d′) + bmnot met(d, d′) + “.”
18: else
19: output better(d, d′) + fmmore(d, d′) + “. For example: ”+
nl-Support-for-more(d, d′, P : 1) + “.”
20: end if
21: else
22: if wd(d′) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
23: output better(d′, d) + fmmore(d′, d) + “. For example: ”+
nl-Support-for-more(d′, d, P : 1) + “.”
24: else
25: output eq(d, d′) + nmmost(d, d′) + “.”
26: end if
27: end if
• Given an argument for worse(d′, d) labelled P : x in a chosen dispute tree, when
its support contains assumption nAttr(d, a), nl-Support-for-worse(d′, d, P : x)
denotes “decision d does not have redundant attribute a but decision d′ does”.
• Given an argument for more(d, d′) labelled P : x in a chosen dispute tree, when
its support contains assumption nMet(d′, g), nl-Support-for-more(d, d′, P : x)
denotes “decision d′ does not achieve goal g but decision d does”.
• Given an argument for nWD(d) labelled P : x in a chosen dispute tree, when its
support contains assumptions nMet(d, g) and nMore(d, d′), then we make use of
nl-Support-for-nWD(d, d′, P : x) to denote “on the one hand, decision d does
not achieve goal g but decision d′ does; on the other hand, decision d does not
achieve more goals than decision d′”.
Here and subsequently, x in the label P : x of an argument in a dispute tree denotes an
element of the set of natural numbers N, with x = 1 if the argument in the root. With
an abuse of notation, when there is no ambiguity, we also use x to denote the argument
labelled with P : x.
With the intuition of our ranking given in Section 4, for any decisions d and d′,
Algorithm 1 works as follows. (i) if one of ms(d) and ms(d′) is admissible in the
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Algorithm 2 Comparison between d and d′ based on dispute tree with root argument
{ms(d)} ` ms(d) with respect to the MRSD ABA framework.
1: procedure COMPARE1(d, d′, t)
2: comment: t is DT (ms(d))
3: if ms(d′) is admissible in the MRSD ABA framework then
4: output eq(d, d′) + bmall(d, d′) + “ and ” + bfewest ra(d, d′) + “.”
5: else if nSD(d′) is the claim of a proponent’s argument P : x in t then
6: output better(d, d′) + fmall(d, d′) + “. For example: ”+
nl-Support-for-nSD(d′, P : x) + “.”
7: else
8: if worse(d′, d) is the claim of a proponent’s argument P : y in t then
9: output better(d, d′) + ffewer ra(d, d′) + “. For example: ”+
nl-Support-for-worse(d′, d, P : y) + “.”
10: else
11: output eq(d, d′) + bmall(d, d′) + “.”
12: end if
13: end if
14: end procedure
corresponding MRSD ABA framework, then the algorithm generates explanations by
making use of the chosen admissible dispute tree according to Algorithm 2 (see lines
2 and 7 in Algorithm 1); (ii) else if one of mw(d) and mw(d′) is admissible in the
MRWD ABA framework, then the algorithm generates explanations by making use
of the chosen admissible dispute tree according to Algorithm 3 (see lines 4 and 15
in Algorithm 1); (iii) else the explanation is constructed from the chosen admissible
dispute tree of nSD(d) in the MRSD ABA framework (e.g. see line 11 in Algorithm
1), or from the chosen dispute tree of more(d, d′) in MRWD ABA framework (e.g. see
line 19 in Algorithm 1).
Moreover, to efficiently generate text for explaining why a particular decision is
better than another, instead of translating the whole chosen tree, only some specific
parts of the tree need to be looked at. Thus, Algorithms 2 and 3 just extract use-
ful information from some chosen dispute tree to generate explanations for pairwise
comparison. For instance, Algorithm 2 checks arguments for nSD(d′) in the chosen
admissible dispute tree DT(ms(d)) with respect to the MRSD ABA framework. If
there exists a proponent argument for nSD(d′), because of the admissibility of the cho-
sen dispute tree DT(ms(d)), an explanation “d′ is not strongly dominant but d is” can
support that “d is better than d′” (see lines 5-6 in Algorithm 2). Similarly, arguments
for nWD(d′) in Algorithm 3 are checked in the chosen dispute tree (see lines 5-12 in
Algorithm 3). Moreover, proponent arguments for worse(d′, d) in the chosen dispute
tree are useful for explaining why a decision is better than another (see lines 8-12 in
Algorithm 2 and lines 14-18 in Algorithm 3).
Let us illustrate our algorithm with the running legal example as follows.
Example 9 (Example 8 continued). From earlier discussions, we know that d2 (case
No. 97) is the best decision. Comparing d2 with d8 (case No. 1962), Algorithm 1 can
provide an explanation. Firstly, since the argument {mw(d2)} ` mw(d2) is admissible
as d2 is MRWD, the procedure for comparing d2 and d8 based on the dispute tree of
mw(d2) is invoked (line 4 in Algorithm 1). According to Algorithm 3 and the dispute
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Algorithm 3 Comparison between d and d′ based on dispute tree with root argument
{mw(d)} ` mw(d) with respect to the MRWD ABA framework.
1: procedure COMPARE2(d, d′, t)
2: comment: t is DT (mw(d))
3: if mw(d′) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
4: output eq(d, d′) + bmnot met(d, d′) + “ and ” + bfewest ra(d, d′) + “.”
5: else if nWD(d′) is the claim of a proponent’s argument P : x in t then
6: if d′′ does not appear in t then
7: output better(d, d′) + “ because, ” + nl-Support-for-nWD(d′, d, P : x) + “.”
8: else if mw(d′′) is admissible in the MRWD ABA framework then
9: output better(d′′, d′) + “ because, ” + nl-Support-for-nWD(d′, d′′, P : x)+
“. Moreover, ” + eq(d, d′′) + bmnot met(d, d′′) + “and ” + bfewest ra(d, d′′)+
“. Thus, ” + better(d, d′) + “.”
10: else
11: output better(d, d′′) + ffewer ra(d, d′′) + “. Moreover, ” + better(d′′, d′)+
“ because, ”+ nl-Support-for-nWD(d′, d′′, P : x) + “. Thus, ” + better(d, d′) + “.”
12: end if
13: else
14: if worse(d′, d) is the claim of a proponent’s argument P : y in t then
15: output better(d, d′) + ffewer ra(d, d′) + “. For example: ”+
nl-Support-for-worse(d′, d, P : y) + “.”
16: else
17: output eq(d, d′) + bmnot met(d, d′) + “.”
18: end if
19: end if
20: end procedure
tree of mw(d2) shown in Figure 3, since the argument {mw(d8)} ` mw(d8) is not
admissible as d8 is not MRWD, and nWD(d8) is not the conclusion of any proponent
argument (indicating that d8 is not weakly dominant), whether or not worse(d8, d2) is
the claim of any argument in a proponent node will be checked (see line 14 in Algorithm
3). Since worse(d8, d2) is the claim of the argument labelled with P:32, which contains
deviate(a9), indicating that d8 has more redundant attributes (a9) than d2, the system
outputs:
d2 is better than d8 because d2 has fewer redundant attributes than d8. For
example, d2 does not have redundant attribute a9 but d8 does.
Furthermore, when being posed with the question: “why is d2 (case No. 97) better
than d1 (case No. 245)?”, our algorithm gives:
d2 is better than d1 because, d1 does not achieve goal “the defendant is
older than 18” (g1) but d2 does, and decision d1 does not achieve more
goals than d2.
The following theorem shows that our algorithms for generating natural language
explanations match the decision ranking mechanism described in Section 4:
Theorem 3. Given the ordering as defined in Definition 5, for any two decisions d, d′ ∈
D, d  d′ if and only if Algorithm 1 outputs text containing better(d, d′); and d ∼ d′ if
and only if Algorithm 1 outputs text containing eq(d, d′).
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Proof. (i) For any decisions d, d′ ∈ D, if d  d′, here we just consider the case of
d is strongly dominant and d′ is not, other cases can be proved similarly. Since d is
strongly dominant and d′ is not, we need to consider two cases: (a) If ms(d) is admis-
sible, since d′ is not strongly dominant, there must exist an proponent’s argument for
nSD(d′) in the chosen dispute tree of {ms(d)} ` ms(d) in the MRSD ABA framework,
and thus according to Algorithm 2 (line 6), the output is: better(d,d′)+fmall(d,d′) +
“For example: ”+nl-Support-for-nSD(d′, P : x)+“.”; and (b) if ms(d) is not admissi-
ble, by Lemma 1, we have d not MRWD, and thus by Algorithm 1 (line 11), the output
is better(d, d′) +fmall(d, d′)+“For example: ”+nl-Support-for-nSD(d′, P : 1)+“.”.
And if Algorithm 1 outputs text containing better(d, d′), here we just consider the case
as shown on line 6 in Algorithm 2 (i.e., better(d, d′)+fmall(d, d′)+“For example: ” +
nl-Support-for-nSD(d′, P : x)+“.”) (other cases can be proved similarly). We know
that nSD(d′) is the claim of a proponent’s argument (P : x) in the chosen admissible
dispute tree with root {ms(d)}`ms(d). It is easy to see that sd(d′) is inadmissible. By
Corollary 1, d′ is not strongly dominant. Thus, since d is strongly dominant, we have
d  d′.
(ii) For any decisions d, d′ ∈ D, if d ∼ d′, we just focus on the case when d ∼ d′,
because both d and d′ are MRSD (other cases can be proved similarly). By Theorem 1,
we have ms(d) and ms(d′) are admissible. Thus, according to Algorithm 2 (line 4), the
output is eq(d, d′)+bmall(d, d′) +“ and ” +bfewest ra(d, d′)+“.”. And if Algorithm 1
outputs text containing eq(d, d′), here we just consider the case of output as in line 9 in
Algorithm 1 (i.e., eq(d, d′)+bmall(d, d′)+“.”), other cases can be proved similarly. We
know that both sd(d) and sd(d′) are admissible. By Corollary 1, d is strongly dominant
and d′ is strongly dominant. Thus, by Definition 5, we have d ∼ d′. 2
7. Evaluation
This section presents an empirical study of our argumentation-based model of
decision-making and explaining in the context of identifying most similar legal cases
to a new case.
7.1. Hypotheses
In Section 3, we presented an illustration from the legal domain (see Examples 5
and 6), where past cases most similar to a given case are considered as best decisions.
Thus, firstly we expect that, based on their professional experience, legal practitioners
will agree that the case recommended by our minimal redundancy criterion is indeed
the most similar alternative. That is, we have:
Hypothesis 1. Our recommendation based on the idea of minimal redundancy is con-
sistent with subjects’ judgements based on their professional experience.
Secondly, our explanations are based on the assumption that in influencing users’
favorability and trust towards our recommendations, it is crucial to transparently ex-
plain why one case is more similar to an open case than another. In other words,
we expect that our natural language explanations are useful for users to analyse the
similarities between legal cases. So, we need to figure out how much users find our
explanations helpful. Thus, we propose:
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Hypothesis 2. Among those users who have non-neutral attitudes about the usefulness
of natural language explanations, a higher ratio of users rate positively than negatively.
Thirdly, in order to evaluate the usefulness of our natural language explanations,
also it is required to compare our natural language explanations to other alternative
explanation techniques (Hoffmann, 2005). One of those alternatives is debate tree
explanations, which is a standard output of argumentation engines. However, before we
choose debate tree explanation as our target of comparison, we need to make sure it is
meaningful (i.e., debate tree explanations are useful for users to analyse the similarities
between legal cases). Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 3. Among those users who have non-neutral attitudes about the usefulness
of debate tree explanations, a higher ratio of users rate positively than negatively.
Fourthly, the major difference between our natural language explanations and de-
bate tree explanations is that with natural language explanations we can easily high-
light similar and distinct factors between cases. Such highlighting cannot as easily be
achieved using debate tree explanations, because debate trees prioritise the presentation
of argumentation structures. As a result, after testing the above hypothesis, we should
test the following one:
Hypothesis 4. Our natural language explanations are more useful than graphical ex-
planations via debate trees.
7.2. Subjects
First, we need to determine the sample size of subjects. We follow the principle for
evaluating knowledge based systems (such as ours in this paper), proposed in Menzies
(1998):
Sample size (N) should be carefully controlled. Small sample sizes are
hard to analyse. However, as random sample sizes get larger, they ap-
proach a bell shape (the normal distribution) that is a well-understood
distribution. In practise, N greater than 20 is acceptable and N greater
than 30 is encouraged. On the other hand, there may be no benefit to
make N very large (Cohen also argues that sample sizes of N greater than
50 can be pointless (see Cohen (1995), p. 116)).
Thus, we chose a sample size between 30 and 50 in our experiments. Specifically, we
got 33 lawyers and judges, from seven different affiliations in the cities of Guangzhou
and Foshan in China. We explained to them that the experiments aimed to evaluate
the effectiveness of our methods. We did not train them in navigating debate trees, but
conveyed to them the basic intuition for reading and understanding these trees.
7.3. Experimental procedure
Since the sample size is limited in our study, the repeated measure design could
reduce the variance of estimates of treatment-effects, allowing statistical inference to be
made with fewer subjects (Winkens et al., 2006; Vickers, 2003). According to Winkens
et al. (2006), it is more efficient to have more than two repeated measures. Thus, we
28
Table 10: First Task.
No. Case Sentence
245
Li, the defendant, aged between 16 and 18, stole some
private property in collusion with others repeatedly, and
the value of the stolen goods was huge.
1 year
imprisonment with
¥1,000 fine
97
Xie, the defendant, was older than 18, stole two trailers,
property of Foshan AA Company and valuing 146,570
Chinese Yuan (e.g. an extremely huge amount of private
property). The stolen goods could not be found.
10 years
imprisonment, 3
years deprivation
of political right
and ¥10,000 fine
633
Liao, the defendant, was older than 18, and stole some
private property in collusion with others. The value of
the stolen goods was large (3480 Chinese Yuan). The
stolen goods could not be found.
5 months
imprisonment with
¥1,000 fine
New Case: Lu, the defendant, was older than 18 when he stole goods worth an ex-
tremely huge amount. The stolen goods have been found.
decided to have each experiment consisting of three tasks (see Tables 10-12). Each task
includes a new case, without any sentence, and a table of past, real cases about theft,
from the Nanhai District People’s Court in the city of Foshan, Guangdong Province,
China, with the sentence given by the Court. To make the assessment as objective as
possible, all the cases in each task were selected randomly.
After presenting the outcome of our method, in terms of the most similar past case
identified using the notions in Section 3.2, the subjects were asked:
Question 1. How much do you agree that the past case is indeed the most similar,
using a 5-point scale (i.e., 5=strongly agree, 4=agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree,
2=disagree, and 1=strongly disagree)?
After presenting the natural language explanation for comparison, as computed by
the algorithms in Section 6, the subjects were asked:
Question 2. How much do you agree that these comparisons are useful to analyse the
similarities between legal cases (again according to the 5-point scale above)?
After presenting the comparison using debate trees (e.g. Figure 4), offering a graph-
ical view of how a similar case is chosen by our method of minimal redundancy, the
subjects were asked:
Question 3. How much do you agree that these debate trees are useful for you to anal-
yse the similarities between legal cases (again according to the 5-point scale above)?
Question 4. Do you agree that the natural language explanation is more useful than
debate trees, seen as explanations, on the same 5-point scale?
Thus, the measures for Hypothesis 1 were collected through Question 1 and sub-
jects’ choices of the most similar case. Since Question 1 is related to the intuition of
best decision, which has nothing to do with the fact that such an intuition reading is au-
tomatically generated or not, the subjects were not asked to compare the automatically
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Figure 4: Example of debate tree used in experiments, for Questions 3 and 4.
30
Table 11: Second Task.
No. Case Sentence
1962
Zhou, the defendant, was older than 18, stole some pri-
vate property in collusion with others, and the value of
the stolen goods was extremely huge. Others played a
leading role while Zhou was referred to as accessory.
The stolen goods have been found.
7 years
imprisonment with
¥7,000 fine
96
Chen, the defendant, was older than 18 and stole a
Dongfeng van (worth 26736 Chinese Yuan) in collusion
with others. The stolen goods are worth a huge amount
and have been found.
3 years and 3
months
imprisonment with
¥3,000 fine
355
Lu, the defendant, was older than 18 and stole goods
worth an extremely huge amount. The stolen goods
have been found.
10 years
imprisonment, 3
years deprivation
of political right
and ¥10,000 fine
New Case: Mao, the defendant, was older than 18 when steeling some private property
of the AA Bidding Company. The value of the stolen goods (found) was huge.
generated reading with the hand-crafted one. Questions 2 and 3 were used to collect
measures for the usefulness of natural language explanations (i.e., Hypothesis 2) and
debate tree explanation (i.e., Hypothesis 3), respectively. Hypothesis 4 was tested in
two ways: (i) analysing the measures collected from answers to Question 4, and (ii)
statistically comparing the measures collected from answers to Questions 2 and 3.
7.4. Hypotheses Test’s Results
In this subsection, we test the four hypotheses on the basis of questionnaire data.
Figure 5 shows the overall average ratings elicited from the 33 subjects for each
of the four questions. The average rating for each question is about 3.65 out of 5
(precisely, 3.90, 3.85, 3.40 and 3.83, respectively). This indicates that, in average, the
subjects found our method of selecting the most similar case by minimal redundancy
decision criterion acceptable, and for our natural language explanation, they agreed
that it is useful and preferred it to debate trees.
To test Hypothesis 1, we need to investigate how many times subjects marked the
same case as the most similar as recommended by our method. From the data shown in
Table 13, we can conclude that, for each task, among those subjects who have selected
what they believed to be the most similar cases (i.e., 30, 31, and 31 subjects, respec-
tively), more than 84% of them marked the same case as recommended by our method.
Apart from the behavioural measurement, through Question 1, we asked the subjects to
self-report their satisfaction with our recommendation. The average rating from them
in all tasks is 3.9 out of 5 (Standard Deviation (SD) is 0.87). From Figure 6, we can
see that for each task, at least 70% of the subjects either agreed or strongly agreed that
the recommended case is the most similar to the new case, while less than 12% dis-
agreed or strongly disagreed with this. After examining Cronbach alpha measures of
internal consistency (i.e., reliability) for responses collected from three tasks, it is rea-
sonable for us to combine three responses to form a single index s for further analysis
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Table 12: Third Task.
No. Case Sentence
751
Mao, the defendant, was older than 18 and stole some
private property of the XX Bidding Company. The
value of the stolen goods was huge. The stolen goods
have been found.
3 years and 3
months
imprisonment with
¥3,000 fine
801
Wen, the defendant, was older than 18, and stole some
private goods in collusion with others. The value of the
stolen goods was large (2,720 Chinese Yuan). Since
the defendant committed the crime of theft within 5
years after serving a sentence of 1 year and 2 months
of imprisonment due to committing a crime of theft on
7 April 2009, Wen is deemed a recidivist.
6 months
imprisonment with
¥1,000 fine
802
Qiu, the defendant, was older than 18 and stole some
private goods in collusion with others. The value of
the stolen goods was large (6,100 Chinese Yuan). The
stolen goods have been found.
6 months
imprisonment with
¥1,000 fine
New Case: Yang, the defendant, was older than 18 when he stole some private prop-
erty of the AA Company. The value of the stolen goods (found) was large. Since the
defendant committed the crime of theft within 5 years after serving a sentence of 7
years of imprisonment due to illegal possession of drugs on 26 October 2006, Yang is a
recidivist.
Table 13: Subject marked the same case as recommended by our method.
Task Valid Frequency Percent (%)
1 30 29 97
2 31 26 84
3 31 30 97
(α = .765) (Zhou et al., 2008; Domino and Domino, 2006). A chi-square goodness-
of-fit test was conducted with s to determine whether an equal number of non-neutral
ratings from types of positive and negative were received, and the minimum expected
frequency was 15. The chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicates that there is statistically
significant difference in the subjects’ ratings of positive and negative among those non-
neutral ratings (87% versus 13% of 30 non-neutral ratings, χ2(1) = 16.13, p < .0005).
Therefore, the fact that a majority of votes are in favour of a positive answer, together
with the result of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, concludes a support in favour of
Hypothesis 1.
Through Question 2, we can figure out whether or not the subjects found our natural
language explanation useful (Hypothesis 2). The average rating from the 33 subjects
on the usefulness of natural language explanation is more than 3.7 out of 5 for each task
(for the first task: M =3.73, SD=1.008; for the second one: M =4.00, SD= .750;
and for the third: M = 3.82, SD = .917). According to the feedback shown in Fig-
ure 7, for each task, at least 67% of the subjects either agreed or strongly agreed that
our natural language explanation is useful for analysing the similarities between cases,
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Figure 5: Average ratings across the 33 subjects.
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Figure 6: Responses to Question 1.
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Figure 7: Responses to Question 2.
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Figure 8: Responses to Question 3.
while less than 15% of them disagreed or strongly disagreed with this. Moreover, af-
ter examining Cronbach alpha measures of internal consistency for responses collected
from three tasks, we combine three responses to form a single index nl for further anal-
ysis on the usefulness of natural language explanation (α= .869) (Zhou et al., 2008;
Domino and Domino, 2006). A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was done with nl to
determine whether an equal number of non-neutral ratings about the usefulness of nat-
ural language explanations from types of positive and negative are received. Since we
collected 31 non-neutral ratings about the usefulness of natural language explanations,
the minimum expected frequency is 312 =15.5. From the result of chi-square goodness-
of-fit test, we can conclude that among those non-neutral ratings there is a statistically
significant difference in the subjects’ ratings of positive and negative (83% versus 17%
of 31 non-neutral ratings, χ2(1)=14.23, p< .0005). So, a majority of votes in favour
of a positive answer, together with the result of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test,
concludes a support in favour of Hypothesis 2.
Similarly, through Question 3 we can analyse whether or not the subjects found
that debate trees are useful for their analysis (Hypothesis 3). Contrary to the natural
language explanations, the collected responses shared higher standard deviations and
the average rating from the 33 subjects is less than 3.6 out of 5 for each task (for the first
task: M = 3.33, SD = 1.291; for the second task: M = 3.33, SD = 1.137; and for
the third task: M = 3.55, SD = 1.175). As shown in Figure 8, for each task, except
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Figure 9: Responses to Question 4.
the neutral ratings, less than 20% of the 33 subjects chose the negative ratings (i.e.,
strongly disagree or disagree) while a larger percentage of subjects (more than 47%)
chose “agree” or “strongly agree”. Moreover, we combined three responses based on
different tasks to form a single index dt for further analysis on the usefulness of debate
tree explanations (α = .965) (Zhou et al., 2008; Domino and Domino, 2006). From
the result of chi-square goodness-of-fit test, we can conclude that there is a statistically
significant difference in subjects’ ratings of positive and negative among those non-
neutral ratings (71% versus 29% of 24 non-neutral ratings, χ2(1) = 4.17, p = .041).
Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported.
As stated before, Hypothesis 4 is tested in two ways: (i) analysing the measures
collected from subjects’ self-report on Question 4, and (ii) statistically comparing the
measures collected from Questions 2 and 3. Now we discuss the first way first. The
average rating from the 33 subjects is more than 3.76 out of 5 for each task (for the
first task: M = 3.88, SD = .96; for the second task: M = 3.85, SD = .97; and
for the third task: M = 3.76, SD = .97). From Figure 9, we can see that in each
task, more than 20% of the subjects strongly agreed that natural language explanations
are more useful than debate tree explanations, at least 52% of them also agreed with
such a preference, while a quite low percentage (less than 9%) disagreed or strongly
disagreed. We combined three responses based on different tasks to form a single
index pr for further analysis on the preference of explanation types (α = .871) (Zhou
et al., 2008; Domino and Domino, 2006). The chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicates
that agreements and disagreements on the preference were not equally reported by the
subjects (93% versus 7% of 28 non-neutral ratings, χ2(1) = 20.57, p < .0005). That
is, most of the subjects believed that natural language explanations are more useful
when analysing the similarities between legal cases.
Then we turn to discuss the second way for testing Hypothesis 4 statistically: the
paired sample t-test was conducted on the combined ratings of usefulness for the natu-
ral language explanations (i.e., nl) and for the debate tree explanations (i.e., dt).9 The
9Note that the ratings on the usefulness of natural language explanations is slightly skewed (skewness =
−0.493, also see Figure 7). However, according to the rule of thumb “skewness values within ±1.0 are
considered relatively normal” Hahs-Vaughn and Lomax (2012), it can still retain a relatively normal distri-
bution. The case of kurtosis statistic is similar. Thus, the normality assumption of the paired t-test has been
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paired sample t-test, whose applications include repeated-measures designs that this
study contain, is a statistical procedure used to determine whether the mean differ-
ence between two sets of observations is zero (Hahs-Vaughn and Lomax, 2012). The
procedure for a paired sample t-test can be summed up in four steps:
(i) Calculate the sample mean:
d =
(nl1 − dt1) + (nl2 − dt2) + · · ·+ (nln − dtn)
n
= 0.444.
(ii) Calculate the sample standard deviation:
σˆ =
√
((nl1 − dt1)− d)2 + ((nl2 − dt2)− d)2 + · · ·+ ((nln − dtn)− d)2
n− 1 =
1.227.
(iii) Calculate the test statistic:
t =
d− 0
σˆ/
√
n
=
0.444− 0
1.227/
√
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= 2.08.
(iv) Look up the value T in the t-distribution table with n− 1 degrees of freedom and
compare t to T . In our case, we have T = 2.037 with p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Since t > T , we can reject the null hypothesis (i.e., the mean difference between both
ratings for natural language explanations and debate tree ones is zero) and conclude
that there is a significant difference in the ratings for natural language and debate tree
explanations. This finding together with the higher mean of rating for natural lan-
guage explanations (M=3.85, SD=0.8) than that for debate tree explanations (M=3.40,
SD=1.2) concludes a support in favour of Hypothesis 4.
Putting all the above feedbacks together, we can conclude that, based on our ex-
periments, our proposed minimal redundancy criterion is approved by most legal prac-
titioners, and our argumentation-based natural language explanations can support well
legal practitioners to analyse the similarities between legal cases.
8. Related work
In this section, we discuss in which way our work advances the state-of-art.
8.1. Argumentation-based decision-making
There are a number of studies on argumentation-based decision-making and anal-
ysis. Amgoud and Prade (2009) propose the first (to the best of our knowledge) gen-
eral argument-based framework for decision-making and explaining. Our work differs
from theirs in several aspects: (i) they base their decision model on abstract argumen-
tation, whereas we base ours on ABA; and (ii) they rank decisions by counting pro
and con arguments without any further explanations for pairwise comparison, whereas
met.
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we rank decisions on the basis of decision-making criteria with natural language ex-
planations for pairwise comparison provided. Matt et al. (2009) introduce a special
family of ABA frameworks for reasoning about the benefits of decisions, and thus
view, as we do, best decisions as dominant decisions corresponding, within the fam-
ily of argumentation frameworks considered, to admissible arguments. However, our
best decisions are not only dominant, but also minimally redundant. Moreover, our
model can explain why decisions are best, or better than or as good as other decisions.
Mu¨ller and Hunter (2012) present a decision analysis system based on argumentation.
Their model is developed from the ASPIC+ framework (Prakken, 2010; Modgil and
Prakken, 2014), whereas our work uses ABA. Furthermore, they do not present any
algorithm for the generation of natural language explanations for decisions, as we did
in this paper. Visser et al. Visser et al. (2012b,a, 2013) use logic-based instances of
abstract argumentation (Dung, 1995), taking into account preferences over attributes
as well as decision criteria. Differently from these approaches, our methods focus on
providing (argumentative and natural language) explanations for best decisions, using
as a starting point an argumentative counterpart, in terms of ABA, of the problem of
determining best (minimally redundant strongly/weakly dominant) decisions. Fan and
Toni (2013) present basic decision frameworks and criteria, and illustrate how goal
preferences can be included in decision making in Fan et al. (2013). Our work in this
paper builds on top of theirs with new decision criteria introduced and an algorithm
for natural language explanation for explaining the selected decisions constructed, but
without considering preferences over goals. Heras et al. (2013) propose a customer
support framework using agent societies with case-based argumentation. Their agents
reach agreements for best solutions by engaging in argumentation dilogues. However,
they use value-based argumentation (Nawwab et al., 2008), whereas our work is based
on ABA; also they present dialogue graphs to justify their reasoning process, while
our work generates natural language explanations, which in some cases may be easier
for ordinary human users to understand, as our experiments seem to suggest. Ferretti
et al. (2017) propose a method to compare alternative decisions using argumentation
frameworks, which is similar to our method. However, they use abstract argumentation
frameworks whereas we use ABA. Moreover and more significantly, their work does
not include any method for automatically generating explanations of pairwise compar-
isons.
8.2. Multi-attribute decision-making
There are two categories of multi-attribute decision-making (MADM) models. The
first one consists of those in which each attribute/criterion is either absolutely satisfied
or absolutely not satisfied by alterntive decisions. In the second one, attributes/criteria
may be partially satisfied, to some extent, by some decisions, and in this case the
problem is a fuzzy MADM problem. In contrast, approaches in the first category are
called crisp MADM ones. Our method in this paper can be deemed to be crisp.
Most crisp MADM models do not explain which factors cause a decision to be
better than another. Our model instead is explainable, in the sense discussed in the
paper, and could also be seen as providing argumentation-based explanation for any
crisp MADM model coinciding with our decision model. Whereas in some MADM
settings, notably Labreuche (2011), explanation for a selected decision is achieved by
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analysing properties’ weights together with decision scores, our focus is on natural lan-
guage generation of pairwise comparison explanations rather than weight-based ones.
Recently several researchers proposed fuzzy MADM models to handle criteria’s
evaluations with various complex fuzzinesses. As an example, to deal with degrees
to which an alternative decision satisfies criteria, Park et al. (2017) develop two ap-
proaches based on the concepts of entropy, cross-entropy, and similarity measure;
Zhang (2016) propose one based on prioritised aggregation operator (more operators
of this sort can be found in Luo et al. (2003b, 2015)), and Yu et al. (2016) also do so by
developing several operators to aggregate all the criteria’s evaluations. However, to the
best of our knowledge, none of these approaches have any functionality for explaining
the decisions they recommend.
It is interesting that Ceballos et al. (2017) study how to choose an appropriate model
among a number of fuzzy MADM models to solve a given fuzzy MADM problem.
Specifically, they examine several fuzzy MADM models against over 1,200 randomly
generated decision problems, and reveal their similarities and differences, the impact of
their parameters settings, and how they can be clustered. According to their analyses,
one may be able to explain why to choose one instead of another method to solve a
given fuzzy MADM problem, but the kind of explanation has nothing to do with the
explanation for why one decision is made by a fuzzy MADM model. Instead, our
work provides human users with a natural language explanations for recommended
decisions.
There are other kinds of uncertain MADM models. For example, Ma et al. (2017)
propose a MADM model to deal with ambiguity, i.e., the imprecise and uncertain eval-
uation of criterion weights as well as the ambiguous evaluations of the groups of de-
cisions regarding a given criterion. Moreover, they study how cognitive factors may
cause a deviation from rational decisions. Instead, in our model best (minimally redun-
dant and dominant) decisions are guaranteed.
8.3. Case-based reasoning
As illustrated in all the legal examples in the paper, our model supports case-based
reasoning through a different mechanism from existing ones. For instance, though both
HYPO (Ashley, 1991; Ashley et al., 2008) and our model can identify cases that are
most similar to given cases, our approach also produces argumentative explanations in
natural language. CATO (Aleven, 2003) (an extension of HYPO) can instead provide
argumentative explanations for outcomes for new cases based upon similarity with past
cases. Their arguments are in favour of an outcome based on factors shared with past
cases and against an outcome based on factors different from past cases. Instead, our
argumentative explanations, in the specific legal setting we have used for illustration,
are used for identifying most similar cases, rather than outcomes. Moreover, our ex-
planations are generated from an argumentative reformulation of a decision-making
method. Additionally, unlike HYPO and CATO, which are specific to law, our model
is generic and can be used in other domains (as our medical Example 4 illustrates).
Prakken et al. (2015) give a reformulation of CATO in terms of argument schemes
represented in ASPIC+ (Prakken, 2010; Modgil and Prakken, 2014), thus allowing in
principle for the automatic generation of CATO explanations within a framework for
computational argumentation. We have used ABA and its computational machinery as
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a method for the automatic generation of explanations, coupled with template-based
natural language generation algorithms, for any decision-making setting where mini-
mal redundancy may be useful.
As another example of a CBR proposal, Athakravi et al. (2014) study legal reason-
ing from past cases, which allow prediction of judgements for new cases, in the same
spirit of our motivating example. Nonetheless, our approach differs from theirs in the
following aspects: (i) we are concerned with determining and explaining most similar
cases to a new one, while they focus on the extraction of relevant attacks from past
cases with an assumed default judgement for the new case; and (ii) we sort past cases
according to multi-attributes decision criteria, while they sort cases according to the
ability to overturn judgements of other past cases. Cyras et al. (2016) also propose an
argumentation-based CBR method, but they are not concerned with the rationality of
recommendations, and their explanations are in terms of dispute trees only, rather than
in natural language.
Furthermore, Roth and Verheij (2004) propose a case comparison model for legal
reasoning in terms of dialectical support for conclusions. Our work is different from
theirs in that we determine the similarity of past cases to a new case by decision-making
criteria. Moreover, although past cases can also be ranked in terms of their dialectical
support in Roth and Verheij’s work, their method does not offer a natural language
explanation for the ordering.
In generic CBR settings, Armengol and Plaza (2012) explain to users why some
cases are retrieved by providing an explanation scheme for similarities in CBR. How-
ever, using their method, users do not know why other cases are not retrieved. Instead,
our work supports both functionalities by means of explanations as dispute trees via the
ABA mapping and explanations in natural language for pairwise decision comparison.
McSherry (2005) studies recommender system with a CBR based approach. Their
work improves the efficiency and transparency of the recommendation process by fo-
cusing on explaining relevant questions to users. Our approach focuses on provid-
ing explanations for decisions recommended by our model in multi-attribute decision-
making, on its own and in comparison with alternatives.
8.4. Template-based Natural language generation
From complex data streams, the natural language processing task of producing
readable text in ordinary language (Winograd, 1972; Reiter and Dale, 2000) is Natural
Language Generation (NLG). Many NLG practical applications have been developed,
including writing weather forecasts (Reiter et al., 2005), summarising medical data
(Portet et al., 2009) or generating hypotheses (Quinlan et al., 2012). Our proposal for
generating explanations in natural language for comparing decisions can be seen as a
further application of template-based NLG. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the
first NLG work in the context of argumentation-based decision-making.
9. Conclusion
In this paper, we have identified a new decision criterion, minimal redundancy,
and together with two existing notions of dominance, we can select decisions that
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achieve most goals but with fewest redundant attributes (i.e., attributes not contribut-
ing to achieving goals). Also we have developed mappings onto a form of structured
argumentation, ABA, for the two resulting decision criteria, serving as a basis for ex-
plaining decision selection. Furthermore, by defining a total ordering amongst all de-
cisions, we have formally defined a ranking mechanism for decisions. To construct
natural language explanations for why one decision is more preferred than, or as pre-
ferred as, another, we rely on an underlying argumentative counterpart to identify best
decisions. To support transparent explanation in decision-making, our natural language
explanation algorithm takes advantage of the argumentation-based approach. To illus-
trate and evaluate our model, we have developed an application study in the practice
of law. Namely, we identify the most similar law cases, from a past case repository,
to a new given case. Moreover, we present a natural language explanation for why a
case is more similar than others. Such an explanation is important for human users,
e.g. lawyers, to better understand and trust the cases recommended by our approach. A
preliminary user evaluation indicates that our natural language explanations are useful
for supporting human decision makers.
Our work leaves many open issues such as the following. (i) We just focused on
decision problems with Boolean attributes and goals, but many interesting real prob-
lems cannot be modelled under these restrictions (Luo et al., 2003b). So it would be
interesting to extend our model to accommodate fuzzy attributes and goals, and apply
it into other fields (e.g. automated multi-attribute negotiation (Luo et al., 2003a; Zhan
et al., 2018)). (ii) The legal CBR landscape has considered much more sophisticated
forms of CBR than our illustrative legal example in this paper. For example, Horty
(2011); Horty and Bench-Capon (2012) distinguish factors (attributes) for or against
an outcome, and rules extracted from factors and reasons extracted from cases as well
as preferences amongst them. In the future, it would be worth exploring whether or
not our method for extracting argumentative explanations in natural language could be
fruitfully deployed to support legal CBR in all its richness. (iii) Although our user eval-
uation for the legal case-based reasoning example is encouraging, it would be worth
doing more systematic and sizeable evaluations, for instance, to test whether or not
our model works well if other accusations are concerned (as in the CATO legal case-
based reasoning system developed by Aleven (2003)), to compare with other explana-
tion techniques (e.g. the argument representation techniques presented by Hoffmann
(2005)), and to check whether or not it outperforms methods and systems support-
ing argumentation-based case-based reasoning (e.g. the system recently developed by
Al-Abdulkarim et al. (2016)). (iv) Each of our evaluation experiments also included
requests for free suggestions from the participants, which could be studied further. For
example, some participants suggested to consider that some goals/attributes may be
more important than others, and define decision criteria involving both attribute re-
dundancy, as defined in this paper, and preference ranking over goals (e.g. along the
lines of Fan et al. (2013), or considering preferences of various kinds as in Horty and
Bench-Capon (2012)).
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